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Against the backdrop of  the crisis in Ukraine—and 
in the aftermath of  the 2008 war with Russia—the 
small Caucasian state of  Georgia is once again in 
the international limelight. Together with Moldova, 
Georgia will sign its EU Association Agreement, 
which was initially scheduled for the end of  the 
year, on June 27, 2014. The EU Commission has 
put Georgia on a fast track toward EU association 
for fear of  Russian meddling if  the process is pro-
tracted, as it happened in Ukraine.
Previously considered a bureaucratic instrument of  
the European Union, the Association Agreement—
with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) at its core—has become a 
geopolitical hot-button issue. For Russia, Georgia is 
strategically less important than Ukraine, and since 
Russia is currently concerned with mitigating the 
negative repercussions of  the Ukrainian crisis, there 
are hopes that a repetition of  the Ukraine scenario 
is unlikely to occur in Georgia. However, Moscow 
has made it clear that it views Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration in its near neighborhood as an unacceptably 
hostile act. Among Georgian diplomats and ana-
lysts, there is consensus that Russia will use every 
tool in its box to prevent a definite integration of  
Georgia into the West. The question is not whether 
but when and by what means Russia will interfere.
Apart from Russian pressure, there is another chal-
lenge to Georgia’s Western integration. Under the 
new government, the taboo on cultivating good 
relations with Russia—practiced during the period 
in which Mikheil Saakashvili was president of  
Georgia—has gradually been lifted; now there is 
room for public debate on an “alternative future” 
for Georgia, a scenario in which Georgia is out-
side the Euro-Atlantic space and cooperates more 
closely with Russia. Newly established pro-Russian 
NGOs and ultra-conservative segments of  the 
Georgian Orthodox Church—which emphasize the 
ideological proximity to Russia—fuel this discourse, 
although it is still marginal. Combined with general 
skepticism about the degree of  protection that the 
West could in fact provide against Russia and con-
cerns that the DCFTA could have short-term nega-
tive effects on the Georgian economy, this could 
well lead to a rise of  Euroskepticism in a country 
that has hitherto been enthusiastic about the EU.
Georgia’s Pressure Points
What are Georgia’s pressure points in a possible 
conflict with Russia over signing the Association 
Agreement? On the one hand, Russia is running out 
of  strings to pull. The disruption of  political and eco-
nomic relations before and during the war in August 
2008 has forced Georgia to diversify energy and trade 
flows. Ninety percent of  Georgia’s gas supplies come 
from Azerbaijan. In the first quarter of  2014, Rus-
sia was only Georgia’s fourth-most-important export 
country—after Azerbaijan, the EU, and Armenia—
and the fifth-most-important import country, after the 
EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and China. The most impor-
tant foreign direct investments came from the Neth-
erlands, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. 
Russia ranked fifth.
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On June 27, Georgia will sign an Association Agreement with the EU—the same type of  agree-
ment that triggered revolution and crisis in Ukraine. Despite all efforts to reduce its dependency 
on Russia, Georgia remains in a vulnerable position. Russian pressure is to be expected, either in 
the run-up to the signing or in its aftermath, while Georgia will stay in the EU’s antechamber, 
without security guarantees from NATO. In view of  Russian attempts to exert influence and a 
possible rise of  Euroskepticism within Georgia, the EU’s challenge is to keep the country on the 
European track.
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At first glance, Georgia therefore seems not to be 
as vulnerable as Ukraine or Moldova. However, 
Georgia and Russia have begun to rebuild informal 
relations over the last year in a “rapprochement” 
process, initiated after the new government of  Bid-
zina Ivanishvili took office in October 2012. The 
most important results include lifting a Russian 
embargo on Georgian wines and waters in June 
2013 as well as regular meetings between Georgia’s 
special envoy, Zurab Abashidze, and Russia’s depu-
ty foreign minister, Gregory Karasin. Although the 
European Union, the United States, and Georgian 
media and political circles have praised this détente 
process as an important step, it also provides Russia 
with new means of  exerting pressure. A possible 
re-introduction of  Russian embargoes on Georgian 
imports would significantly hurt the Georgian wine 
industry, which now again delivers 70 percent of  its 
total exports to Russia. Although the Russian for-
eign ministry spokesperson Alexander Lukashevich 
had already warned against “bilateral and financial-
economic consequences” from the Russian side in 
reaction to the signing of  the Association Agree-
ment, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili 
expressed his confidence that it would be signed 
without complications. However, many politicians 
remain skeptical, fully aware that good neighborly 
relations are more important for Georgia than they 
are for Russia.
Russia’s most important levers for undermining 
Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration course are 
Georgia’s two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Despite the improvements in Geor-
gian-Russian relations, the “borderization” pro-
cess (the setting up of  fences and barbwire at the 
administrative boundary line, particularly between 
Georgia and South Ossetia) presents fertile ground 
for further provocations. On March 6, only one 
day after Štefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, visited 
Tbilisi, both a Russian helicopter and a Russian 
drone violated Georgian airspace at the boundary 
line to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, flying over 
nearby Georgian police stations. The Georgian par-
liament was in the process of  discussing a resolu-
tion against Russia’s annexation of  Crimea at that 
very moment.
Even if  Georgian officials deem it unlikely, these 
provocations show that Russian military action in 
response to the signing of  the Association Agree-
ment cannot be ruled out. The distance between 
South Ossetia, where around 3,500 Russian soldiers 
are stationed, and Russia’s next military base in 
Gyumri, Armenia, which has around 3,000 soldiers, 
is only about 250 kilometers; a Russian military 
advance from South Ossetia to Gyumri would not 
only split Georgia in half  but also interrupt the 
main road, rail, pipeline, and infrastructure links 
between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
A possible pretext for military action could be 
the “protection” of  Russian-speaking Armenians 
in southern Georgia. The region of  Samtskhe-
Javakheti, with a 54-percent Armenian majority, is 
poorly integrated into Georgian politics and society, 
and already saw unrest after the closure of  a Rus-
sian military base there in 2007, which had been 
an economic lifeline to the 95,000 Armenians liv-
ing there.1 However, no separatist movement has 
emerged so far, and rumors about a mass distribu-
tion of  Russian passports turned out to be only 
rumors. Tbilisi is nevertheless concerned that Rus-
sia could spark demands for autonomy. Armenia 
has denied any intentions to engage in a conflict 
over its minorities in Georgia but has recently 
come under increasing pressure from Russia, which 
led, among other things, to Armenia joining the 
Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union.
Apart from military activities, Russia could under-
mine Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration path in 
other, more creative ways. During the last year, a 
number of  new pro-Russian NGOs—with names 
like Eurasia Institute and Eurasian Choice—have 
emerged and stepped up their activities. Suspected 
by the Georgian government of  being financed 
by Russia, their activists have become increasingly 
vocal and visible on the streets of  Tbilisi. There 
was, for example, the screening of  a film portray-
ing NATO’s Kosovo mission as a campaign against 
global Eastern Orthodoxy, and there were demon-
strations against Georgia’s Western foreign-policy 
orientation in front of  the vacant Russian embassy. 
The agenda of  these NGOs is in large part iden-
tical; they combine anti-Westernism with ultra-
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conservative ideology, trying to create a sense of  
common belonging to an imagined Orthodox and 
Eurasian civilization.
Using NGOs and bloggers to sway Georgian pub-
lic opinion is part of  what Russia understands as a 
“soft power” approach. The long-term objective is 
to raise Euro-Atlantic skepticism in order to gradu-
ally shift pro-Western consensus in Georgia toward 
a more “neutral” stance, opening up new possibili-
ties for Russian influence. In the political arena, 
such a position of  “neutrality” is only supported 
by Nino Burjanadze, former speaker of  parlia-
ment, and her party Democratic Movement–United 
Georgia, which is part of  the ruling coalition. Bur-
janadze was among the first to advocate restoring 
relations with Russia after the war in August 2008 
and met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow in March 
2010. In October 2013, her party polled 10 per-
cent in the presidential elections, making it a minor 
force that is nonetheless one to be reckoned with.
The Russian Normative Challenge
How popular are these pro-Russian positions 
with the Georgian population? According to the 
la test polls, the large majority of  the population 
(65 percent in April 2014, down from 68 percent 
in November 2013) supports EU membership 
for Georgia, while only 16 percent (in April 2014, 
up from 11 percent in November 2013) prefer 
membership in the Russian-led Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union. Only 20 percent think that Georgia 
would benefit more from abandoning European 
integration in favor of  better relations with Rus-
sia, while 58 percent are convinced that EU- and 
NATO-integration is more beneficial to their 
country.2 Despite a slight downward trend, it is safe 
to assume that the population supports the Euro-
Atlantic aspirations of  the Georgian political elite.
The picture gets more complex, however, when it 
comes to the question of  values. While democratic 
political values are well established in Georgia, lib-
eral social attitudes toward women, religious and 
ethnic minorities, and the LGBT community have 
yet to take root in Georgian society. In particular, 
LGBT rights have proven to be a divisive issue: 
while 62 percent of  Georgians consider the protec-
tion of  minority rights to be important for Geor-
gia’s democratic development in general, only 24 
percent deem the protection of  LGBT rights to be 
important or very important; and 48 percent think 
this issue is not important or not at all important.3
The wealthy and powerful Georgian Orthodox 
Church plays an important role in evoking a value 
gap between “traditional Georgian values” and 
what it holds to be “alien and imposed” European 
values. Similar to its Russian counterpart, the Geor-
gian Church considers itself  a bulwark of  conser-
vative Orthodoxy against “Westernization.” For 
example, the adoption of  an anti-discrimination law 
in May 2014—a prerequisite for the signing of  the 
Association Agreement and explicitly mentioning 
sexual orientation and gender identity as grounds 
of  discrimination—was criticized by the Georgian 
Patriarch Ilia II as a “huge sin,” and Orthodox cler-
ics actively took part in the violent dispersion of  a 
LGBT demonstration in May 2013.
The contradiction between the European Union’s 
understanding of  liberal values and the more 
conservative social attitudes in Georgian society 
could well play into Russian hands.4 Although 
Georgians want to belong to the West politically, 
many of  their social values are for the time being 
more aligned with Russia’s normative agenda—and 
the Georgian Orthodox Church provides the link 
between these two. With around 80 percent of  
Georgians describing themselves as religious, the 
voice of  the Georgian Orthodox Church carries 
considerable political weight. Patriarch Ilia II was 
a forerunner in Georgian-Russian rapprochement 
after the war of  August 2008 and met with Putin in 
July 2013 during a visit to Moscow.
However, it would go too far to call the Georgian 
Church a Trojan horse for Russian influence. For 
one thing, the Georgian Orthodox Church is cer-
tainly not interested in subordinating itself  to its 
much younger Russian counterpart, as happened 
at the beginning of  the nineteenth century. Sec-
ondly, the Church is well aware of  Georgia’s painful 
recent history with Russia; calling openly for a pro-
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Russian foreign policy change would be unaccept-
able to its members. Therefore, the Church con-
fines itself  to emphasizing its ideological proximity 
to the Russian Orthodox Church, while at the same 
time undermining the EU’s normative agenda—
with the easiest rallying point being LGBT rights. 
Similarly, discussions in Armenia and Ukraine 
about EU integration have included propaganda 
campaigns arguing that a choice for the European 
Union is a choice for homosexuality.5
The European Union realizes that it could lose 
popularity in parts of  Georgian society on these 
normative issues. EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Štefan Füle assured the Georgian Patriarch during 
his March visit that the EU would not undermine 
any of  Georgia’s “traditional values.” In return, he 
received the Patriarch’s verbal approval of  Georgia’s 
EU integration and the signing of  the Association 
Agreement. Whether either side is ultimately able 
or willing to fulfill this deal remains doubtful; the 
EU is no more likely to ignore the discrimination 
of  minorities within Georgia than the Georgian 
Orthodox Church is likely to change certain of  its 
fundamental ideological beliefs.
Hence, Georgia is not only facing possible Russian 
political, economic, and military pressure but also 
a Russian normative challenge. To the surprise of  
the West, Russia has been successful in promot-
ing a reactionary ideology that is gaining currency 
within the global marketplace of  ideas. Although 
it is more a mishmash of  different conservative 
strands than a clear-cut concept, it is kept together 
by nationalism, autocratic rule, and all sorts of  
“antis” (anti-globalism, anti-Westernism, anti-mod-
ernism, and of  course anti-homosexuality).6 Under 
the heading of  “Eurasianism,” Russia engages in a 
project of  region- and norm-building in its imme-
diate neighborhood.
Although Western influence is strong in Georgia, the 
question remains of  how Europeanized the Georgian 
population is in terms of  identity and values, and 
whether the enthusiasm for European integration 
could withstand Russian pressure and “soft power” 
activities. For the time being, the anticipated benefits 
of  European integration—economic growth and visa 
liberalization—seem to outweigh any perceived threat 
to “traditional values.” The DCFTA is expected to 
boost Georgia’s GDP by 1.7 percent in the short term 
and 4.3 percent in the long term, but a great many 
standards and regulations are yet to be implemented, 
and the impact of  the DCFTA on job creation will be 
marginal. Real benefits from the DCFTA will be felt 
only in the mid term, after a period of  adjustment. 
If  the government is unable to mitigate potentially 
negative aspects of  the DCFTA implementation, this 
might contribute to a possible rise of  EU fatigue and 
skepticism within the population.7
Western Credibility
Whether an alternative future for Georgia within 
a Russian sphere of  influence could become a real 
and more likely scenario also depends on the West’s 
firmness and credibility. As much as concerns about 
Russia are rising within Georgia, there is also a pal-
pable rise in disappointment and disillusionment with 
the West. Events in Ukraine have served as a painful 
reminder for Georgia that, despite all promises and 
perceived benefits of  Euro-Atlantic integration, the 
promises still lack one crucial aspect: security guaran-
tees. Not being part of  a collective defense alliance, 
Georgia—like Ukraine and Moldova— lives in an 
everyday security limbo. Translated into reality, this 
means that Georgia stands alone if  worse comes to 
worst, as happened in 2008. Conscious of  this crucial 
strategic weakness of  Euro-Atlantic integration, Geor-
gian foreign policymakers have stepped up their calls 
for granting Georgia a NATO Membership Action 
Plan (MAP) at the NATO summit last September. 
But President Barack Obama’s comments that Geor-
gia is not on the path to NATO membership poured 
cold water on Georgia’s hopes. After all, with more 
than 1,500 Georgian soldiers in Afghanistan, Georgia 
is the fifth biggest supplier of  troops there.
The basic conundrum of  Georgian foreign policy 
is how to improve relations with Russia while at the 
same time working toward EU—and NATO—mem-
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bership. Russia has declared that EU and NATO 
membership for countries in its direct neighborhood 
consists of  crossing a “red line” and that it is willing 
to act on these principles, as its response in Ukraine 
has shown all too clearly. Although it has not yet been 
openly articulated in Georgian politics, the obvious 
question is therefore: What is Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion actually worth if  it does not provide a security 
guarantee against Russia and perhaps even increases 
the likelihood of  Russian intervention?
For the time being, Georgia has no real alternative to 
Western integration, as “neutrality” is not an option 
for a small country in Russia’s immediate neighbor-
hood; like its neighbor Armenia, Georgia would 
immediately come under Russian pressure. However, 
if  no serious steps are taken to integrate Georgia 
more closely into the Euro-Atlantic space, Georgians 
might feel they have no choice but to pursue a more 
accommodationist policy with Russia.8
Whether such steps should include NATO MAP 
is highly controversial. There are many reasons to 
believe that granting Georgia MAP would indeed 
provoke Russian countermeasures, without provid-
ing protection by NATO allies in return. It is not 
for nothing that Polish foreign minister Radosław 
Sikorski advised his Georgian counterparts to be 
careful with security guarantees that are not made 
credible. For there is little doubt that they will be put 
to the test by Russia.9 But there are other, alternative 
ways to bind Georgia closer to NATO: MAP is not 
officially required for NATO membership. Instead, 
the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual 
National Plan could be upgraded to fulfill MAP’s 
functions, that is, by promoting inter-operability and 
conducting performance reviews.10
The Association Agreement: a 
Watershed for Georgia?
The political elite in Georgia considers the Asso-
ciation Agreement to be a means of  cementing 
the country’s European course. By signing these 
documents, however, Georgia is not yet out of  the 
storm. On the contrary, it is just the beginning of  
another, most-likely long-lasting waiting period in 
the European Union’s antechamber—without secu-
rity guarantees from NATO, either.
Russia will continue and step up its efforts to pre-
vent Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, especially 
now that it has belatedly grasped the inherently 
transformative power of  the EU’s bureaucratic 
mechanisms of  integration in Ukraine.11 However, 
Russia may think that there is still enough time to 
deal with Georgia even after the EU Association 
Agreement has been signed, since Russia does not 
feel its strategic interests are as acutely endangered 
as they were in Ukraine.
Therefore, it is not the signing itself  that presents 
the main challenge for the West but rather keeping 
Georgia on the European track afterward, in the 
face of  Russian attempts of  pressure and influence. 
Georgia remains in a vulnerable position; in this 
regard, the signing of  the Association Agreement 
constitutes no watershed. Moreover, although Tbili-
si’s determination to continue the path of  Euro-
Atlantic integration is strong, Euroskepticism is 
likely to gain a stronger foothold. Disappointment 
about low economic benefits, a lack of  security 
guarantees, and the inherent contradiction between 
Georgian “traditional values” and the EU’s liberal 
normative agenda bear the danger of  engendering 
disillusionment with the European dream.
The smartest approach for Russia to take would be 
to wait patiently until the inherent contradictions 
and tensions of  Georgia’s Western path rise to the 
surface—and then to reap the fruits. Yet Russia is 
not known to be patient, especially when it comes 
to issues in its neighborhood. Even if  everything 
seems to be quiet for the time being, Georgia’s 
signature of  the Association Agreement means it 
must be prepared for anything. In times like these, 
a pro-Western stance in Russia’s immediate neigh-
borhood is not simply a foreign-policy choice; it is 
a looming risk for the country and its population.
Liana Fix is an associate fellow at the DGAP’s 
Center for Central and Eastern Europe of the 
Robert Bosch Stiftung.
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